Georgia’s NATO Membership on Track, says David Miliband
August 20, 2008
Foreign secretary says keeping alliance’s pledge to grant Georgia membership is ‘important signal’
The formal process leading to Georgia’s membership of Nato has begun, partly because of Russia’s occupation, David Miliband said today.
In an interview with the Guardian in Tbilisi, the foreign secretary said Georgia had been given a “route map to membership” after the formation on Tuesday of a joint commission aimed at forging closer ties.
He said the commission was an important step towards implementing a pledge made by Nato leaders at a summit in April.
“I think the formal process kicked off yesterday with the establishment of a Nato-Georgia commission, and we have taken seriously the commitments the heads of government made in April,” Miliband said. “It’s an important signal but there is also important substance to it.”
Some European diplomats have depicted the joint commission as a sop to Georgia, predicting its membership will be put on hold because of the conflict with Russia that started on August 7.
Miliband rejected that view, arguing the commission would have practical consequences. “In practical terms, Nato is offering close cooperation with the Georgian government and the Georgian military. That means helping the Georgians build up their capacity.
“It means building up proper interoperability with Nato, proper joint training. It also means ensuring the structures of cooperation … are properly geared towards eventual membership. So this is a route map to membership.”
But as Miliband set out the government’s position, Nick Brown, Labour’s deputy chief whip, appeared to contradict him by publishing an article saying that allowing Georgia to join Nato would be a mistake.
Brown, a key ally of the prime minister, used an article for Comment is Free to argue against it being admitted to the military alliance.
The Labour powerbroker made his comments in an article attacking the Conservative leader, David Cameron, for urging Georgia’s membership to be brought forward.
“Cameron urges Nato to admit Georgia. Nato is a mutual defence pact. This position will have gone down very well in Tbilisi, but do we really mean to commit ourselves to an all-out war against the Russian Federation if something like this happens again? I don’t favour that approach and I don’t know anyone who does,” Brown wrote.
The Foreign Office said that although it was opposed to Georgia joining Nato immediately, the comments in Nick Brown’s article did not reflect the government’s position.
Tensions have grown between Russia and Nato as former Warsaw Pact members and ex-Soviet republics on Russia’s borders have joined the alliance.
On the diplomatic front, Nato foreign ministers yesterday suspended their formal contacts with Russia as punishment. The alliance’s secretary general, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, said “there can be no business as usual with Russia under present circumstances”.
Milband rejected the argument that Nato’s expansion into Georgia and Ukraine would dilute its principle of collective defence. Sceptics have said western countries would not be willing to go to war on Georgia’s side against Russia.
Miliband said the Baltic states - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania - had been made full members without devaluing the importance of membership. “Ten years people were saying, how could these countries be members of Nato?
“They are independent countries. They are not ex-Soviet Union. They are independent sovereign countries with democratic governments who have every right to make their own decisions on the basis of their own popular will.
“I think it’s right to see Georgian and Ukrainian membership as part of a process to build up these countries as a permanent fixture of the international landscape, not just as an accident.”
Miliband this morning visited a camp near Tbilisi for people displaced by the conflict and heard what he described as moving “human testimony” from people caught up in the conflict.
The foreign secretary met Malkhaz Sadlobelasvili, 49, who said that he had fled from his village near the border with South Ossetia last week.
“We escaped on a tractor. We had no choice. The fighting had started,’” said Sadlobelasvili, from Pkhvenisi, adding: “My mother is still there. She was too old to flee.”
Another refugee, Ani Berdznishvili, 50, said she escaped from her home in Gori when the Russians bombarded the town. “A bomb came down. It exploded and I saw four people killed in front of me. The Russians are barbarians. We hid in the basement.
“This is our territory. I only intend to go back to my city when the last Russian solider has left.”
Miliband said there was strong evidence that “random killings” had taken place in Georgian villages around Gori. He called for “independent bodies, not governments” to carry out an investigation into claims that South Ossetian and other Russian militias had killed civilians.
Some 128,000 Georgians had been internally displaced by the conflict, Georgian’s minister for health, Sandro Kuitashvili, said this morning.
Russia had pledged to begin its pullout from Georgia on Monday and yesterday a small Russian convoy was reported to have left Gori heading north. But elsewhere in Georgia, Russian troops appeared to be expanding their operations.
Russian troops yesterday paraded around 20 blindfolded and bound Georgian prisoners on armoured vehicles. They had been taken from the Black Sea port of Poti to nearby Senaki, according to Poti’s mayor, Vano Taginadze, who said he was told they would be released today.
The men, said to be Georgian soldiers and police, were taken captive because Georgia refused to let Russian armoured vehicles into Poti, Tagidnadze said. Russian forces in Poti had blocked access to the city’s naval and commercial ports.
Washington made clear it expected Russia to move faster. “It didn’t take them really three or four days to get into Georgia, and it really shouldn’t take them three or four days to get out,” said Gordon Johndroe, the White House national security spokesman.
The Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili, said Russia was not only flouting its withdrawal commitment but its forces were “not losing time” in damaging Georgia by destroying infrastructure.
Source: The Guardain, August 2008
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/20/georgia.nato
Russian President Slams Georgia’s ‘Morons’
August 18, 2008
Russia’s president launched a verbal volley at Georgia’s leaders on Monday, as Georgia hit back with renewed accusations that the Russian invasion was premeditated.
Medvedev said: “The world has seen that even today, there are political morons who are ready to kill innocent and defenseless people in order to satisfy their self-serving interests, while compensating for their own inability to resolve complicated issues by using the most terrible solution — by exterminating an entire people.
“I think that there should be no mercy for that. We will do our best not to let this crime go unpunished.”
He was speaking at a visit to the military headquarters at Vladikavkaz, near the Russian-Georgian border.
Each side accuses the other of “ethnic cleansing” during the conflict over South Ossetia, which erupted August 7.
Will Saakashvili be a Casualty of his Own Tactics?
August 18, 2008
With Georgia pummelled and occupied, critics condemn their President’s decision to provoke the Russian bear
With his country trounced and still occupied by Russian troops, Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili’s own political future might soon be called into question, opposition figures say.
Three days after the President reluctantly signed a peace truce to end a bloody conflict with Russia, there are grumblings about the wisdom of Mr. Saakashvili’s decision to pick a fight with his mighty neighbour.
With concerns mounting that Georgia’s economy will be in tatters once Russian troops leave, some say the 40-year-old President must publicly account for his Aug. 8 military offensive in the tiny rebel republic of South Ossetia.
The Georgian strike sparked a swift and overwhelming response from Russia, which reclaimed South Ossetia in no time, then pushed further into Georgia proper.
“Neither he, nor his government, are competent,” said Temur Koridze, a member of former Georgian president Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s government in the early 1990s.
Mr. Koridze and other government critics say Mr. Saakashvili should have predicted Russia’s crushing response, or at the very least, obtained backup assurances from its European and U.S. allies before going in.
They say the failed offensive underscores the danger of Georgia’s aggressive push to adopt Western values and seek membership in NATO. Both initiatives have long angered Russia.
“We need sound and sane authority,” Mr. Koridze said. “[Mr. Saakashvili], as a commander-in-chief, is a loser. His policy has collapsed.” One European minister who was in Tbilisi this week during a round of diplomatic efforts to halt the fighting, said doubts are rising about Mr. Saakashvili’s judgment within his own government. The minister declined to speak on the record.
However, other opposition leaders, who have strongly criticized Mr. Saakashvili in the past, have remained silent during this conflict, saying this isn’t the time to stoke divisions. They believe that carping at the government is playing into Russia’s hands.
Tbilisi newspaper editor Zaza Gachechiladze added, “Once the Russians are gone, [the criticism] will start.” Mr. Gachechiladze said Russia plans to destroy vast swaths of infrastructure before it vacates Georgian soil, leaving the economy in ruins, further stoking internal dissension.
Indeed, Georgia’s failed military offensive to reclaim South Ossetia has nearly crippled the already impoverished country. Despite a peace truce signed on Friday, Russian troops are still occupying the strategically important city of Gori, which lies on Georgia’s main east-west highway, effectively dividing the country in half.
Russian jets have bombed military bases, ports and radar installations in Georgia over the past nine days.
On Saturday, Russian troops blew up a railway bridge, Georgian officials say, further severing transportation links in the country.
“One day of railway stoppage will have its effect on the Georgian economy, but more so on the delivery of humanitarian aid,” Georgian deputy minister of foreign affairs told reporters on Saturday.
Eka Zguladze said Russian forces set forest fires on Saturday, which could destroy power and phone lines.
“Of course, the fires are causing panic in the local population,” she said.
Mr. Gachechiladze said Georgians also will soon demand answers from the military.
Despite daily media briefing from scores of Georgian officials, there has been no sign of any military leaders. “Does Georgia even have an army?” Mr. Gachechiladze asked.
“There are a lot of questions to ask the President,” he said, namely: Who was the combat commander in charge of the offensive and who made the decision to strike South Ossetia?” Mr. Gachechiladze, who edits an English-language daily, said two of his reporters were killed last week in Tskhinvali.
Valeri Kvaratskhelia, a member of former president Eduard Shevardnadze’s government, said Mr. Saakashvili must apologize to South Ossetians and Georgians, then resign.
A new leader must then begin diplomatic negotiations with South Ossetia and Abkhazia, another breakaway republic on Georgia’s Black Sea coast, he said. “[The offensive] wasn’t just a mistake,” Mr. Kvaratskhelia said. “It was a crime.” Georgia’s opposition is notoriously fragmented, with scores of voices that have never been able to unite to mount an effective challenge on Mr. Saakashvili.
The President came to power in 2004 after a peaceful, pro-democracy movement. Mr. Saakashvili was re-elected last January in an election that many detractors say was rigged. International observers concluded there were some irregularities, but overall the ballot was fair.
However, other Georgian analysts have defended the charismatic and emotive young President, saying Russia has been needling Georgia for years by encouraging ties with South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Source: globeandmail.com, August 2008
www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080818.wgeorgiapresident18/BNStory/International/home
Q&A: Russia-Georgia Conflict Sets Up New Era in Relations with U.S.
August 18, 2008
Russian troops invading the neighboring Republic of Georgia have heightened old tensions between Washington and Moscow.
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Before a peace accord between Russia and Georgia was signed, apparently ending a full-scale invasion after five days, President Bush had condemned Russia’s actions as “dramatic and brutal.”
Dmitri Trenin, deputy director of the Carnegie Moscow Center think tank, discusses ongoing events in the flash-point Caucuses.
Question: What’s at the core of this conflict?
Answer: The core of the conflict is ethnic Ossetian nationalism versus Georgia’s national unification. The roots go back many decades. In the current form, the conflict dates back to 1990 when the Soviet Union was breaking up.
There was a brief war in 1992, stopped by the arrival of Russian forces, which have been acting as peacekeepers ever since. By 2004, tensions had calmed down appreciably, but (Georgia President Mikhail) Saakashvili used force to try to establish control (over regions still loyal to Russia), which led to violence and a deterioration of the situation. In the past several months, tensions and violent attacks had been mounting.
At another level, Russia’s relations with Georgia soured as a result of Tbilisi’s bid to join NATO. The combination this spring of the Kosovo independence and NATO’s promise to admit Georgia led to a serious spike in Russo-Georgian tensions. So, when Saakashvili sought to resolve the conflict by force on August 7, he was met with an armed response from Russia.
Q: Could it spread?
A: The conflict has already spread to Abkhazia, the other unresolved conflict in Georgia. Adjacent areas inside Georgia proper, and some Georgian military installations across the country, have been affected. There has been also “collateral damage” through bombing misses, with Georgian civilians killed.
Russia, however, has halted its advance deep inside the Georgian territory. The capital, the pipelines and the ports and airports are essentially safe.
Q: What does this portend for U.S.-Russian relations?
A: This conflict does not bode well for the U.S.-Russian relationship. Too early to tell how exactly these will be affected: This is for the new U.S. administration to decide, but a chillier and more competitive era is clearly dawning.
Q: What does this portend for other former Soviet territories and Eastern Europe?
A: The Georgian conflicts and Tbilisi’s NATO bid were one of three looming crises in U.S.-Russian relations, all centered on Central and Eastern Europe.
The other two are Ukraine’s NATO bid and the U.S. missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic. I expect more trouble as these potential conflicts mature.
Q: What are you watching for most closely as an indicator of whether this situation will stabilize or tip into more instability?
A: Europe, if it managed to take a united and independent stand, could play the part of a peacemaker, ensuring stability and strengthening cooperation in the continent’s east. However, both unity and independent action on Europe’s part are unlikely.
So I would watch the developments in Ukraine over NATO and in Central Europe over the missile defenses, and Russian reactions to both with intense interest and apprehension. The most important factor, however, will be the Russia policy of the 44th president of the United States.
Source: The Statesman Journal, August 2008
www.statesmanjournal.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080818/OPINION/80816012/1049/OPINION
Saakashvili Ready for Dialogue with Russia
August 18, 2008
Georgia’s President Mikheil Saakashvili announced his readiness for an open dialogue with Russia. The president made the respective statement in the air of Georgian National TV.
Saakashvili has conditioned the dialogue to pulling out of Georgia the occupation troops that are illegally stationed there. He has urged Russia to immediately withdraw its military from Georgia and, after it, think seriously about further negotiations and forms of future relations to prevent final alienation.
No matter what happened between us, Saakashvili went on, Georgia is always open for resolving all issues by dialogue, negotiations and based on the civilized relations. But at first, the occupants must pull out of the country, he emphasized.
The withdrawal of Russia’s troops is due to begin Monday, but the peacekeepers will remain in South Ossetia. Read more
Saakashvili to Face ‘Tough Questions’
August 18, 2008
• Burjanadze: time will come for tough questions;
• Burjanadze: I have to play active political role;
• Opposition: no tome for internal strife now;
• Opposition: NATO must speed-up Georgia membership;
Opposition parties, as well as former parliamentary speaker, Nino Burjanadze, said on August 18 Russian troops’ withdrawal was now a priority, but the government would definitely face “tough questions” afterwards about what led to the conflict and why it all happened.
“I’m afraid it will not be very easy for the government to answer all the questions,” Nino Burjanadze said in an interview with Reuters. “It was impossible to imagine that Russian tanks would be 20-25 minutes drive from Tbilisi, that we would have so many refugees and displaced persons and so many casualties among civilians.”
“I am more than sure that right now I have to play a very active political role in the country,” Burjanadze added in what appears to be her strongest indication of having plans to make the political comeback soon.
Meanwhile, leaders of two opposition parties – Republican and New Rights – Davit Usupashvili and Davit Gamkrelidze, respectively, said at a joint news conference on August 18, that they would continue, what they called, “a moratorium” on conformation with the authorities. But, they said, questions would be asked and analysis would be made of what had happened as soon as the crisis recedes.
Other opposition politicians are also cautious from making any harsh remarks for now, at least for the Georgian media. But on August 15, the Financial Times carried quotes of Levan Gachechiladze, co-leader of opposition coalition and Kakha Kukava, leader of the Conservative Party, warning the authorities about the anticipated protest rallies.
Gachechiladze was quoted by FT.com as saying that the opposition would campaign for elections to be held “at the earliest opportunity”, perhaps within two months. And Kukava was quoted as saying: “Saakashvili was personally responsible for the military operation, and for starting a war we could not win.” He also added the opposition would wait until the situation had cooled and then call for mass demonstrations aimed at removing the government.
As soon as the quotes were carried in the Russian news wires, both of the politicians prompted to announce that their remarks were put out of the context.
“Today, when Russian tanks are rolling on the Georgian territory, on the most part of its territory, we need unity, firmness and our enemies should never see political tensions in the country,” Levan Gachechiladze said on August 15.
“Our position is that Russian tanks should leave Georgia and afterwards discussions will start over who is responsible for what has happened,” Kukava told Civil.Ge.
Meanwhile, in a joint statement the Republican and New Rights parties called on NATO on August 18 to speed up the process of Georgia’s integration into the alliance.
“We call on you, against the background of existing situation and based on the NATO Bucharest summit declaration, to take a decision on Georgia’s prompt integration into the alliance,” the statement reads. “It would be a clear message to everyone, who think to achieve their imperial aspirations through the military means and it also would be a message to all the freedom-loving nations that they are not alone. It would also be a chance for Georgia to finally get rid of armed conflicts and to continue peaceful march towards the democracy.”
Source: Civil. Ge Online Magazine, August 2008
www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=19195
US Envoy Meets Separatists - Video
July 26, 2008
US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza has visited the separatists region of Abkhazia to promote the German plan of conflict settlement.
After negotiating Bryza said that, “we would like to have a meeting in Berlin between all parties - Tbiisi Sokhumi, together with Russia and with all the members of the group of friends, namely us, Germany, Britain and France. To begin with it should be a meeting on the level of experts”.
As it is known, Germany is trying to get sides in the conflict to come to talks in Berlin to discuss its three-stage plan offered by Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmier.
Link to Story:
www.rustavi2.com/news/news_text.php?id_news=27207&pg=1&im=main&ct=0&wth=
Link to Video:
www.rustavi2.com/news/video.php?fr=video&id_news=27207&lang=eng&ftp1=1&ftp2=0&ftp3=0
Source: Rustavi 2 Broadcastin Co., July 2008
Georgian Opposition Bails
July 26, 2008
It became known yesterday that Mikhail Kareli, former governor of Shida Kartli Region in Georgia and close advisor to former Georgian defense minister Irakly Okruashvili, has asked for political asylum in France. Nothing had been known of the fate of the politician, who is accused in Georgia of abuse of office, extortion and corruption, since last November, when he was released from custody on $140,000 bail and immediately disappeared.
The press was informed of Kareli’s whereabouts by opposition For a United Georgia party member Teona Tlashadze. The party was founded by Okruashvili and Tlashadze. Other sources say that Kareli applied for asylum on July 23. Okruashvili also lives in Paris as a political immigrant.
Kareli, like Okruashvili, began his career as a loyal supporter of Saakashvili. He aided Saakashvili in the Revolution of the Roses in 2003 and was awarded with the appointment to the governorship of Shida Kartli, bordering on South Ossetia, a year later, succeeding Okruashvili. After Okruashvili was dismissed and a number of his supporters were arrested in Gori in September of last year, Kareli told thousands at a protest meeting that “the law enforcement organs are fulfilling political orders.” He was dismissed from his post a few days later and arrested on September 23 (a few days before Okruashvili) in the Tbilisi airport as he prepared to board a flight to Europe.
Georgian authorities say they do not know how the former governor left the country. Since there was an international warrant for his arrest, he should have been arrested when he crossed any European border. Okruashvili’s resettlement in France followed the same course. Okruashvili’s lawyer, Eka Beselia, stated that Georgian authorities did not knowingly allow Kareli to flee to avoid imprisoning him. According to Beselia, he will be tried in absentia. The Georgian Foreign Ministry stated that it will demand Kareli’s extradition.
Source: Kommersant, July 2008
www.kommersant.com/p915647/r_527/Georgian_opposition/
Steinmeier’s Plan On Abkhazia: Benign Intentions, Limited Relevence, Blocked by Moscow
July 23, 2008
Germany distributed its plan for a political settlement of the Abkhazia conflict within the European Union’s Political and Security Committee — which includes 27 delegations — simultaneously with Germany’s presentation of the plan in Tbilisi, Sukhumi, and Moscow.
Drafted by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the document has been more or less cleared by the UN Secretary General’s Group of Friends on Georgia, consisting of the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and Germany which chairs the group at this time. Presenting the document on the Friends’ behalf made it look initially as if Moscow was more or less on board. Russia and the Abkhaz authorities, however, rebuffed the document promptly on its official presentation by the German MFA there, even before Steinmeier had reached Sukhumi and Moscow (see EDM, July 18).
Brusquely at first and then more politely, Moscow has basically turned down the German plan despite its far-reaching concessions to Russian interests.
The document accepts the continuation of Russia’s “peacekeeping” operation. This can not be surprising, considering the German MFA’s support for Russian “peacekeeping” in Moldova and Georgia in the name of “stability” since Steinmeier became minister.
It is, however, surprising that the document fails to mention Georgia’s territorial integrity and internationally recognized borders. Such mentions are standard at least pro forma in international documents. Only Russia has ceased even that lip service since the beginning of this year, practically de-recognizing Georgia’s integrity and borders (see EDM, July 11). The omission in the German plan is a striking one and Steinmeier hastened to repair it, at least in words, in Georgia (though not, apparently, at the two other stops on his tour). Emerging from the talks with President Mikheil Saakashvili, Steinmeier found it necessary to add several times during the briefing that Germany respects Georgia’s territorial integrity (Georgian Public TV, July 18).
Surprisingly again for a document under nominal UN aegis, the German plan abandons the usage “Abkhazia, Georgia,” which is standard in UN and other international documents and is designed to imply that Abkhazia is within Georgia. Instead, the German document refers simply to “Abkhazia,” whether inadvertently or otherwise. The document implicitly accepts the fiction that Georgia and Abkhazia are “the parties to the conflict.” This usage, admittedly, has become standard in many international documents, to avoid confronting Russia’s responsibility as party to the conflict and its orchestrator. But the German plan was supposed to change something in this flawed process, not to reinforce those flaws.
The plan consists of three phases, of which the first is the most elaborately presented. Here, “the parties” (Georgia and Abkhazia) would exchange declarations on non-resumption of hostilities. After this, “drawing on existing bodies,” Tbilisi and Sukhumi would establish a framework for direct high-level dialogue, in which the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) and the UNSG’s Group of Friends would serve as facilitators. This is a marginal improvement on the existing situation, in which Russia is the “facilitator.”
Given Russia’s veto power over UNOMIG and the Group of Friends, however, it seems difficult to see how the proposed change could unblock the negotiating process. The plan would allow for any further internationalization “if the parties so agree” — i.e., subject to an Abkhaz veto, without Russia having to cast its own veto.
As regards international peacekeeping (other than Russian), “Both sides will consider a possible deployment of international police.” This leaves the issue again dependent on Russian and Abkhaz consent. Moreover, “Should a threat to security arise, existing mechanisms would be implemented to avoid a military confrontation.” This provision also maintains Russian control on the ground.
The plan enshrines the “general acceptance of the right of return of all internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees to Abkhazia, as well as the obligation to safeguard the full range of their rights.” On the other hand, however, “the parties [Tbilisi and Sukhumi] will agree on the modalities of their return.” This leaves wide scope for Abkhaz or Russian stonewalling, whether overtly or through conditionalities.
The document envisages “Open economic opportunities for the Abkhaz to trade with Georgian and international partners.” This is a two-edged sword, which Moscow will undoubtedly construe as authorizing an expanded Russian economic presence in Abkhazia. The plan’s first phase is expected to be implemented within 15 months.
In the second phase, Germany would host an International donors’ conference with the participation of the EU, UN, OSCE, international financial organizations, Russia, and the United States. Donors would pledge funds for reconstruction of “Abkhazia and areas neighboring the zone of conflict” (those latter areas being apparently the Georgian-controlled districts along the demarcation line).
During this phase, refugees and IDPs would continue returning to their homes in Abkhazia. “The parties,” local communities, and NGOs are to cooperate in creating adequate conditions for living, schooling, the administration, and inter-ethnic cooperation there. Judging from contextual remarks, the return program is initially limited to the Gali and Ochamchire districts.
In the third and final phase, a working group would be created to draft the “political status of Abkhazia” [no mention of Georgia]. The group would consist of “the parties,” “assisted by international facilitators and guarantors.” The UN Security Council would ultimately “endorse the status agreement and monitor its implementation.” A follow-up conference of international donors would then be called to provide further support for reconstruction.
The concept of “guarantors” appears here for the first time in the document and is not defined, whether in itself or in relation to UNSC “monitoring.” This strengthens the impression that the document is only intended as a broad framework, with ample room to take Georgian views more carefully into account and change the unacceptable situation on the ground. This scope for improvement may yet become the German plan’s saving grace.
Source: Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 2008
www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2373246
Bryza: ‘Does Russia Wish To Be A Facilitator, Or A Party To Conflict?’
July 22, 2008
Georgia and Russia are eyeing each other warily over Abkhazia. There are rumblings about rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey. Peace talks on Nagorno-Karabakh are gaining fresh momentum.
The volatile South Caucasus has been making more than its share of news recently, and Matthew Bryza, the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, has been in the center of the action.
Bryza spoke on July 18 with RFE/RL’s Brian Whitmore about the developments in this explosive and strategically important region.
RFE/RL: There’s currently a lot of movement on Georgia and Abkhazia. German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier is engaging in a bit of shuttle diplomacy between Georgia, Abkhazia, and Russia to push that peace plan. Can we expect to see movement on this issue, given that each side has already rejected key components of the plan?
Matthew Bryza: I am just beginning to see the press reports on the Steinmeier visit and it looks like the Abkhaz side echoed [Russian] Foreign Minister [Sergei] Lavrov’s statement yesterday (July 17) extremely unhelpfully and rejected the core concept of what it takes to negotiate a peaceful solution to the Abkhazia conflict. That is, the link of Georgia issuing a nonuse-of-force pledge with the return of internally displaced Georgians to Abkhazia.
That is the absolutely essential bargain that must be struck to be able to move a peace process forward. So I think we’re quite worried when Abkhazia, echoed by Moscow, says they won’t now agree to that bargain, which we have talked about for years. It makes me think that somebody wants to scuttle this good-faith effort by the UN Friends [for Georgia, grouping Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and the United States], and by the German foreign minister, not to mention by the U.S. secretary of state, who was in Tbilisi last week, and all of us in the UN Friends process, to which I am the U.S. representative.
So those are very worrisome public statements coming out of both Sukhumi and Moscow, and I hope it’s just posturing. I hope we will get back to where we were during my own visit to Tbilisi and Sukhumi in May, which was quite close to an announcement of a bargain, or the outlines of a bargain or a deal based on what I said before — the pledge not to use force on the Georgian side, and the pledge that Georgian IDPs (internally displaced people) could return to Abkhazia. And then we would hope that there would be a de-escalation of the military tension in the sensitive Abkhazian-Georgian region of the Kodori Valley.
‘Not A Good Faith Set Of Preconditions’
RFE/RL: The Georgians have also rejected signing the nonuse-of-force pledge, arguing that this would constitute sort of a de facto recognition of Abkhazia’s statehood. But a lot of people are interpreting that as posturing. Do you find the Georgian position unhelpful in this regard?
Bryza: What the Georgians have said is we are not going to issue a nonuse-of-force pledge as a precondition for starting direct negotiations with the Abkhaz. The Russian position and the Abkhaz position is the same: There cannot be direct peace talks unless the Georgians issue the nonuse-of-force pledge as a precondition and unless the Georgians pull out their police from the Kodori Valley, which is sovereign Georgian territory.
It is impossible for any negotiating party to agree to the core elements of the bargain that needs to be struck as a precondition for launching the negotiations. That is not a good-faith set of preconditions. The Georgians have clearly said that of course they are willing to issue that nonuse-of-force pledge as part of a broader bargain — that I outlined a moment ago — during direct negotiations with the Abkhaz and the Georgians. I just can’t understand how anybody who is in favor of peace could possibly say at this moment of high tension regarding the Abkhazia conflict, that there ought to be preconditions to the Abkhaz and Georgians sitting down for direct talks. I think Tbilisi shares that view, but that is U.S. policy.
RFE/RL: Russia appears to be playing two roles in this process. One official, as a member of the Friends group; the other unofficial, as the de facto patron of the Abkhaz side. Can Russia be an honest broker in this situation?
Bryza: That’s a fair question. We have said clearly that Russia’s behavior since April 16, when the Kremlin issued instructions for the Russian government to strengthen its ties to the separatist regions of Georgia, that those actions undercut Russia’s role as “facilitator” of the UN Friends process. And Russia took further steps that undercut its role as the facilitator when it shot down the Georgian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) on April 20, and then moved paratroopers with heavy artillery into Abkhazia without consulting Georgia, which violates the 1994 Moscow cease-fire agreement. Not to mention that the shootdown is a violation of the UN Charter. And just as we got Georgia to a point where it was de-escalating by not flying any more of those UAVs, the next day Russia sent in rail construction troops without consulting the Georgians again.
So every step of the way when we’ve worked with the Georgians meticulously to get them to de-escalate, the Russian side has decided to take a very provocative step. And so if that’s the way it is going to behave and still be a member of the Friends process, it is very difficult practically to get the Friends process to move forward and to finalize this useful paper that our German coordinator of the Friends helped us agree upon back on June 30 in Berlin.
So you ask a core question. And the question really is, to put it in a different way: Does Russia wish to behave as the facilitator of the Friends process, or as a mediator, rather than as a party to the conflict? That is an open question.
RFE/RL: Georgia wants Russia out of the UN Friends Group, but I don’t know that the United States have gotten officially to that point yet.
Bryza: Definitely not. Russia has to be part of the process; it’s just inevitable. Russia has the peacekeepers on the ground, Russia is geographically contiguous to Abkhazia, Russia is trying to use Abkhazia as a construction site or colony for the Sochi Olympics. Russia is going to be part of the game and, frankly, the Abkhaz look toward Russia today for security — physical security, economic security, political security.
So the way out of this can’t be that Russia is not part of the process, that is absolutely impossible. We want Russia in the process.
The way out of this is that the international community, and most importantly Georgia, provides the Abkhaz with those types of security — physical, economic, cultural, and political. What I mean by the latter is that for any agreement to resolve the Abkhazia conflict, 250,000 Georgian internally displaced persons will have to return to Abkhazia, and there are only 55,000 or so Abkhaz. So when those Georgians come back, the Abkhaz must not be worried about being overwhelmed politically or culturally. Their cultural rights need to be preserved, and of course they need to retain some kind of disproportionate political role in Abkhazia, just as we’ve negotiated in Bosnia for minorities there, and just as we’ve talked about in Cyprus, or as Kofi Annan had incorporated into his Cyprus settlement plan.
‘No Restrictions, No Preconditions’
RFE/RL: The United States has its own proposal to replace, or supplement, the peacekeeping mission with an international police force. Is this plan working in concert with the Friends Group plan?
Bryza: Yes, everything we do aims to support the Friends process, and at the same time get direct talks going between Abkhazia and Georgia. If one of the Friends has decided it is against Abkhaz-Georgian direct talks, then that party is making it impossible for the Friends’ agenda to be realized; and we are still going to do everything we possibly can to get the Abkhaz and the Georgians to be able to talk face to face with no restrictions and no preconditions. But we believe that by so doing, we are actually moving the Friends process forward, because that’s the only way you can fulfill the Friends’ mandate of trying to resolve the conflict.
We are also working to try to implement, or further develop, Phase One of this Friends plan. So everything we’ve been doing — when Secretary [Condoleezza Rice] was in Tbilisi and my boss, Assistant Secretary [Daniel] Fried was there, which led to this talk of some other U.S. paper — is really an attempt to get phase one of this Friends plan moving. The Phase One focuses on military de-escalation.
Georgia President Mikheil Saakashvili
So we’re supporting the Friends process. Our proposal is definitely — at this point at least — not to replace the CIS peacekeepers. That’s an issue that has to be worked out between Georgia and Russia in the context of the existing agreements. The 1994 Moscow cease-fire agreement calls for the consent of the host government, as do CIS documents. So Georgia and Russia have to work out the status of the CIS peacekeepers.
We’re not calling for the removal of the CIS peacekeepers; that’s not our business, we have said in Security Council resolutions that we encourage cooperation between CIS peacekeepers and the UN observer mission in Georgia. That said, we do definitely see the need for some security capabilities to complement the CIS peacekeepers — not necessarily to replace, but to complement. Why? Because in the Gali district, in southern Abkhazia, Georgia, there is a serious law-enforcement problem. The Abkhaz police are unable to provide law enforcement for the population there, which is where the largest concentration of ethnic Georgians are; the CIS peacekeepers don’t have a mandate there. Something has to happen, there needs to be a capability.
What we could see there could be a joint Georgian and Abkhaz police with international oversight, be it UN or EU oversight. Back up in the Kodori Valley, similarly, there could be joint Georgian and Abkhaz police that have strong international oversight in the form of the EU or the UN. So we’re trying to think through whether or not these models are workable as a way to complement the existing CIS peacekeepers.
RFE/RL: The U.S. and Georgia are holding joint military exercises near Tbilisi, and Russia is conducting military exercises in the North Caucasus. Both sides said these exercises were planned a long time ago. But some commentators said that with tensions so high, this isn’t really a good idea. Do you think these exercises harm, help, or are neutral as far as the peace process goes?
Bryza: I can’t comment on Russian plans or motivations. What I can say is that we had had this exercise planned for a couple of years. In fact, the participants are not just the U.S. and Georgia, it is also Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Ukraine as part of the NATO Partnership for Peace partners effort. We do one such annual exercise in some country among the NATO PfP partners, and this year it had just so happened to fall to Georgia.
Our decision was, do we cancel it or do we go ahead after Russia turned up the pressure on Abkhazia? And our decision was we should go ahead, this was planned for a long, long time. It is mostly a tabletop exercise in Tbilisi; there aren’t massive maneuvers planned, it’s much more modest than what I’ve heard is going on on the Russian side in the North Caucasus. I would hope it enhances security throughout the region by helping to increase the professionalization and cooperation of all these military forces; professionalism is of course the key to military security.
‘Effort Under Way That Is Genuine’
RFE/RL: Let’s take a look at Armenia. The new president, Serzh Sarkisian, has published a comment in “The Wall Street Journal” intimating that a rapprochement with Turkey is in the works. He invited Turkish President Abdullah Gul to Armenia to watch a football match in September. And now Turkish newspapers are reporting that Turkish and Armenian officials recently held secret talks in Bern. Do you think something is up?
I can say with some confidence that yes, there is an effort under way that is genuine in both Yerevan and Ankara to try to normalize relations between the two countries.
Bryza: Yes, I do. I was just in Yerevan a week and a half ago and saw President Sarkisian, Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian. I was with the foreign minister extensively during his visit in Washington this week. We spent a couple hours together over lunch. And then I was in Ankara last week, on Thursday and Friday (July 10-11) meetings with the prime minister and deputy foreign minister and the Caucasus team and the prime minister’s adviser on foreign policy and the military. So I think I have a pretty good feel for what people are thinking and can say with some confidence that yes, there is an effort under way that is genuine in both Yerevan and Ankara to try to normalize relations between the two countries. RFE/RL: Are we to assume that Gul will accept Sarkisian’s invitation?
Bryza: I sure hope so. I certainly cannot speak for President Gul or the Turkish government, but we sure hope that he does takes advantage of this golden opportunity to use an international event that just is a gift on the calendar to advance all these processes that I’ve just mentioned.
I should also recognize that President Sarkisian took a courageous step by inviting President Gul, and then also by talking about the possibility of a historical commission which engendered a lot of opposition and criticism from Armenian politicians who used to call for those very same steps.
RFE/RL: Russia seems to be taking the lead on this possible detente. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has traveled recently to Armenia and Turkey; Sarkisian was in Moscow when he made his invitation to Gul. Is it acting in concert with the United States?
Bryza: I don’t know of any single step the Russian government has taken to encourage rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia. That’s not a critical statement; that’s just a statement of fact. So I am taken aback by the notion that Russia is somehow leading in this effort. Turkey and Armenia are doing this themselves. Maybe the Russians are saying things quietly behind the scenes; I don’t know. I’m completely unaware of that.
RFE/RL: One analyst we’ve spoken to — someone who follows these things really closely — said he thinks the Russian diplomats got the order to surpass the American initiative on this one.
Bryza: Great! Great if they did! I haven’t seen any evidence thereof, but we’d welcome it. If Russia is encouraging rapprochement between these two countries, that would be a terrific thing.
RFE/RL: Were your recent trips to Turkey and Armenia tied to the rapprochement talks, or was this just a routine visit?
Bryza: Whenever I go to these places, there are just so many items on the agenda. And so agenda items include energy — I was in Turkey with [U.S. Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy] Boyden Gray. And then all the stuff I do bilaterally with Turkey — of which Armenia and reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia is a top-level issue, as are general issues in the Caucasus and Georgia.
So we talked about that, Cyprus, Turkey’s EU accession, and the domestic situation in Turkey, and of course our cooperation with Turkey in Iraq, not only against terrorists but also to facilitate the participation by Sunnis in the political life in Iraq. So there’s a lot on the agenda in Turkey.
In Armenia, I went there also with Turkey-Armenia rapprochement as an issue, but primarily, of course, in my capacity as a Minsk Group co-chair to focus on Nagorno-Karabakh. And, of course, the domestic political situation as Armenia recovers from the problems with the elections and the tragic aftermath.
‘Talks Actually Are Jump-Started’
RFE/RL: The Turkish-Armenian relationship is of course bound up in the Nagorno-Karabakh talks. But those negotiations appear to be stalled. Is there any way to get them jump-started?
The talks actually are jump-started. We don’t talk so openly about what’s happening, and so I wouldn’t expect folks on the outside to know the degree of movement that’s under way…Bryza: The talks actually are jump-started. We don’t talk so openly about what’s happening, and so I wouldn’t expect folks on the outside to know the degree of movement that’s under way, but on June 6, the presidents Sarkisian and [Ilham] Aliyev had their first meeting, in St. Petersburg, and the statements that they made afterward were indicative of a process that is indeed full of life. President Aliyev said that the two presidents established a certain degree of trust in each other, which was amazing. And President Sarkisian echoed that. And then both presidents called on the Minsk Group to reinvigorate its actions now that the Armenian elections are over. And both presidents called on us, the Minsk Group co-chairs, to work with their foreign ministers to try to bridge the gaps in the remaining couple of issues out there in the Basic Principles that were proposed by us co-chairs back in November in Madrid.
So obviously that was a key focus of Foreign Minister Nalbandian’s visit here in Washington, and we the Minsk Group co-chairs are going to get together with the foreign ministers again; I hope it’s going to be on the 31st of July or 1st of August in Moscow. So the process is going, yeah! The question is, of course, can the two sides bridge the gaps on the final couple of issues. Of those issues, a few of them are quite easily resolvable, and then one or one and a half will require some tough compromises.
RFE/RL: Can you tell us any more about these outstanding issues?
Bryza: I can’t, because that would not be fair to the negotiators themselves.
RFE/RL: But what you seem to be suggesting is that there’s movement on Nagorno-Karabakh, and movement on a Turkey-Armenia detente. Is something really big going on?
Bryza: I don’t know. You’ve got wheels that are turning, but wheels that may not lead to a resolution of any of these issues. But diplomacy is about both process and results. And the art of diplomacy is using the process to help parties who think they can’t find common ground to find that common ground. So I’m feeling positive momentum as a result of the process, but it would be a little bit reckless to predict a positive outcome — or a negative one, for that matter. We’ve got to keep our noses collectively to the grindstone, and embrace this positive momentum and try to channel it toward the results we seek.
RFE/RL: We all know there have been a lot of false starts on this. How optimistic are you right now compared to previous times when we thought progress was at hand on this issue?
Bryza: I guess I remain kind of “skesimistic.” We invented that term, skesimistic, in our Minsk Group. Lots of skepticism and optimism as well. I don’t know if I can quantify it, but I can say the prerequisites on Karabakh for reaching agreement on the basic principles may be falling into place.
The two presidents seem to have a certain level of trust in each other and have demonstrated a readiness to engage in a give-and-take that does take into account each side’s needs and interests. Those are the key prerequisites. But that is not a guarantee that the final differences are bridgeable. In any negotiation on something as sensitive and complex as Nagorno-Karabakh, it’s the last issue, or the last couple issues, that are often the hardest to resolve. So I can’t predict what will happen, but I am paid to be an optimist and I feel that those who pay me for that optimism are being well served.
‘We Have Seen Some Progress’
RFE/RL: Before we move on to issues pertaining to Azerbaijan, is there anything you would like to add about Armenia, Turkey, and Karabakh?
Bryza: Yes, there is. President Sarkisian came into office under very difficult circumstances: an election that was questioned and unprecedented postelection violence for the South Caucasus on March 1 and 2. He faces really serious challenges, but he seems to understand what these challenges are, and I personally have confidence in his ability to address those problems, which still require some work.
Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian
What those are are arrests of opposition politicians, opposition activists for their participation in the events of March 1 and 2. There still is a political divide between the government and opposition that we would like to see closed. There are still some restrictions on freedom of assembly. So all those issues need to be worked through.
We really want to see the release of those activists and politicians who are still under arrest. There are some trials pending for people who were arrested on March 1st and 2nd for political reasons. We would like to see all that go away and be resolved in accordance with the rule of law and democratic principles.
Again, though, that all said, we do sense that the president, Sarkisian, does recognize these serious challenges and the need to restore democratic principles. We have seen some progress on rule of law in the economic sphere under his prime minister, [Tigran] Sarkisian — same surname, no relationship. So overall, the domestic situation in Armenia is hopefully on a more positive trajectory.
There will be a big decision that our Millennium Challenge corporation will have to take — I mean the board will need to take — in September about whether to continue the program. And the board decided in June to follow a wait-and-see approach and hope that the, at that time, very nascent signs of a restoration of democratic momentum will gain their own momentum. I hope that is what we are now seeing, but it is too early to tell.
I think that it is by virtue of restoring the democratic momentum that Armenia will become more confident and more able to advance the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. Just as I would argue that rapprochement with Turkey should also help Armenia become more able to be more flexible in the negotiations. And we want to see the same thing happen on the Azerbaijani side.
We hope that as these processes move forward, Azerbaijan will see it in itself to use its burgeoning economic wealth as a way to bring the parties together, rather than increase any sort of tension. And as far as using wealth to build understanding, President Aliyev has actually shown that vision and we commend him for that.
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev
RFE/RL: Azerbaijan’s presidential election is scheduled for October. Do you think the current environment in that country, with so many journalists in prison and the atmosphere of intimidation so strong, is conducive to free and fair elections?
Bryza: President Ilham Aliyev seems to understand the importance of conducting an election that the international community recognizes as free and fair. That goal is a central focus of our relationship with Azerbaijan, with his government, and with him. So we hope that his election will prove to be just that.
It’s true, however, that the arrests of journalists, what people are reporting as harassment of them, and limitations on freedom of assembly, work against the perception and perhaps the reality that the election will be free and fair. We have been working through our embassy and our assistance programs that are managed here and in Baku to try to get the mechanisms of democracy of an election in place so that the election will be as free and fair as possible.
I can’t handicap what the outcome will be now, but I can say that as in Armenia, where we had an unprecedented level of violence after the election — an election that was questioned — so do we want to make sure that the procedures are in place to make sure this election is seen as free and fair as possible.
RFE/RL: How much leverage does the United States have to get these journalists out of prison?
Bryza: I don’t know how to assess how much leverage we have, I can just say that getting these people out of jail is a high priority, it’s something we work on every day — I do, and our ambassador does. We need to be constantly pushing on that issue. I should just add that Azerbaijan is an important friend of the United States — Azerbaijan overall, the entire country. We have a lot of important issues on the agenda.
We have three key sets of strategic interests — expansion of political and economic freedom to reform, or democratic and market economic reform; security cooperation; and, of course, energy cooperation with Azerbaijan. We need to be moving forward in all three sets of those interests and encouraging Azerbaijan’s evolution toward democracy as a key element. We know that in the long run, stability will come from legitimacy, which requires free and fair elections. So that’s what we’re pushing toward.
Source: RFE/RL, July 2008
www.rferl.org/content/Abkhazia_Bryza_Nagorno_Karabakh_Turkey_Armenia/1185188.html