Suspicious Minds
September 13, 2008
It’s mutual mistrust, rather than a difference in basic outlook, that plagues the relationship between Russia and the west
A decade ago a member of Abkhazia parliament told me that “the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia would not be resolved until Russia and the west divide their spheres of interests”. We were sitting on the Black Sea coast and I thought that the guy was crazy. Surely, the conflict was between Georgians and Abkhazians, or Georgians and South Ossetians, and it was up to them to resolve their differences. How naive I had been. In his now traditional Valdai encounter with western experts, Prime Minister Putin confirmed what was obvious to separatist politicians 10 years ago.
The logic of the current discord runs as follows: The west assumes that Russia invaded Georgia in August to punish it for its Nato bid. It would have loved to do so to the Baltic states when they were joining Nato, but had no power at a time. Following this line, Ukraine is to be persecuted next, if not militarily, then politically and economically. Western efforts need to be geared to building a bastion around Ukraine to protect it from being the next victim.
Diplomat: Russia Stalling Over Georgia Observers
September 12, 2008
Talks with Russia on sending additional international monitors to keep tabs on South Ossetia and Abkhazia collapsed Friday, a senior Western diplomat said, warning that Moscow’s hard-line stance had thrown into question its pledge to withdraw troops.
The official, who has been intimately involved in three weeks of negotiations, accused Russia of stalling for time in an effort to keep observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe out of the two breakaway regions.
“It has become clear that Russia doesn’t want any agreement. I think they’re afraid of what the observers will see,” the diplomat told The Associated Press, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to publicly discuss the talks.
Helsinki Commission Casts Critical Eye On Russia’s ‘Power Politics’
September 11, 2008
Calling it “one of the most important hearings the Helsinki Commission is conducting this year,” U.S. Senator Ben Cardin led an inquiry into what Russia’s invasion of Georgia means for U.S.-Russian relations and European security.
Cardin (Democrat-Maryland) is co-chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the U.S. Helsinki Commission, an independent government agency that monitors compliance with the agreements of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The commission held a hearing in Washington on September 10 that looked at the Russian invasion of Georgia and “the return of power politics.”
The commission is made up of nine members from the Senate, nine members from the House of Representatives, and one member each from the State, Defense, and Commerce departments. Among the questions legislators wanted to know were what leverage the United States has against Russia and whether Russia is sending a larger signal about its intentions toward other countries.
One of Cardin’s first questions for Matt Bryza, deputy assistant secretary for European and Eurasian affairs, followed Bryza’s testimony that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was told by her Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, that by its military action, Russia had hoped to unseat the democratically elected government of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvilli.
Cardin called that “deeply disturbing” and asked whether Georgia’s domestic politics had been destabilized since the crisis began.
‘That’s Not Relevant’
Bryza said the Georgian people, including opposition leaders, have rallied behind their government. He said the United States “categorically rejects” the prospect that Russia might succeed in its goal of destabilizing the Georgian government, but added that the United States has no particular allegiance to Saakashvilli himself.
“I want to make clear that what we support is any democratically elected government of Georgia. Anyone,” Bryza said.
“We may be personally fond of or dislike current leaders in Georgia — that’s not relevant. What matters is that the Georgian people elected this leadership, and it is the Georgian people that must determine the political future of the country. There may be early elections. Who knows? There could be referendum. Whatever the Georgian people decide, in consultation with their elective leaders, is fine by the United States government, as long as it is the Georgian people deciding.”
Cardin also wanted to know whether Russia’s aggression toward Georgia signaled a change in its policy toward its other former republics, and he asked in particular about Ukraine.
Bryza said that in Ukraine, “all eyes are on Crimea,” the Black Sea peninsula where ethnic Russians outnumber Ukrainians and where many residents have been receiving hastily issued Russian passports over the past month. In Moscow, there has been talk recently that former Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was wrong to cede the region to Ukraine.
Bryza said the United States “can only hope that those statements are no more than bluster.”
‘Serious Damage’
But on the question of what the United States could do if they prove to be more than that, Bryza echoed other White House officials who have said Russia is already paying a high cost for its actions. He said the country has lost $20 billion in investment since the Georgian invasion and suffered “serious reputational damage.” Any additional leverage the United States might have, he said, remains to be seen.
“We have leverage that can play itself out in a whole series of ways, in terms of reputation, in terms of economics, and you could go beyond that in terms of other measure that are being considered,” Bryza said.
“But for now, we don’t want to be sounding like we’re wagging our finger, raising threats. We don’t want to burn bridges. We want to escalate, if need be, prudently, whatever leverage we might employ, but always with the hope and the anticipation that at some point Russia will recognize the costs are simply too high of continuing on this path.”
Also appearing before the Helsinki Commission was Paul Goble, the director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. He told lawmakers “what has happened in Georgia was a disaster that was waiting to happen and that can be repeated elsewhere across the former Soviet space.”
“The reality,” Goble continued, “is that the border system that was created in Soviet times was intended to create tension and to justify authoritarianism. In 1991, the United States welcomed the end of authoritarianism but also said the borders could never change because we were concerned that that could tear things apart. The consequence of that was to delay this problem, but it is going to be a worse future, not a better one.”
Goble said across Eurasia, groups of ethnic minorities are “trapped” in countries they don’t feel a part of, and as a result, border tensions are rising in many places.
He advised U.S. lawmakers to consider adopting new foreign policies. One, to not recognize borders that are changed by force. Two, to expand U.S. ties to people of the post-Soviet region through the development of more exports. And three, to reaffirm the U.S. commitment to the right of nations to self-determination.
Inviolability Of Borders
A representative from Russia had been invited to testify at the hearing but declined. Representing Georgia was David Bakradze, the speaker of the Georgian parliament, who told the panel that what is happening in Georgia is bigger than the fate of one small country because it “challenges basic principles of international security.”
By using military force in an attempt to change another country’s government, he said, Russia has threatened the cornerstone of European security — the inviolability of borders. Bakradze said the invasion had also strengthened Russia’s monopoly over European energy supplies.
He asked the panel to consider what kind of an international partner Russia would make, given that it has broken its own agreement to withdraw its forces from Georgia.
“I mean, how can Russia — able to make a decision to send tanks and troops to a neighboring country — be a reliable partner for the United States? Or for Europe?” he asked.
“So this is a fundamental question. How can Russia, which signs an agreement to withdraw from Georgia — and I refer to the six-point agreement — and confirms that the presidential signature is there, and they will implement this, and it is still not implemented. It was signed 29 days ago and still it is not implemented. How can Russia, which does not respect the signature of its own president, which doesn’t respect its own commitment, which does not respect international law, how can Russia be a reliable partner for the United States or for anybody else?”
Act Of War
Under questioning about why Saakashvilli had gone against “specific” U.S. advice not to engage Russia militarily, Bakradze confirmed that U.S. officials had warned Georgian leaders not to respond to Russian provocations. But he said that, to his knowledge, the United States never specifically advised against a Georgian move against Tskhinvalli, the capital of South Ossetia, because “there was never a plan to do so.”
At a certain point, Bakradze said, the provocations became an act of war that Georgia had to respond to, and he offered evidence that he said proves Russian tanks and troops entered Georgian territory on August 7 through the Roki Tunnel, the only road connecting North Ossetia, in the Russian Federation, to South Ossetia.
“At this point, this is still not public, but we have radio interceptions confirming Russian troops entering Georgian territory in the evening of August 7,” Bakradze said.
Bakradze called that “the turning point” where the Georgian government had to make the decision to defend its territory and respond.
Source: RFE/RL, September 2008
www.rferl.org/content/Helsinki_Commission_Casts_Critical_Eye_On_Russias_Power_Politics/1198019.html
Zurabishvili: Georgia Is ‘Facing A Simple, Yet Tragic, Question’
September 11, 2008
As a high-ranking EU delegation visited Tbilisi after a successful diplomatic visit to Moscow earlier in the day, a key Georgian opposition figure visited the studios of RFE/RL’s Georgian Service on September 8 to discuss the world’s diplomatic efforts in relation to the crisis in Georgia.
Salome Zurabishvili, a former foreign minister and current chairwoman of the opposition party Georgia’s Path, spoke with RFE/RL’s Giorgi Gvakharia in Tbilisi.
RFE/RL: How would you assess the role of the EU in resolving the current crisis, particularly in light of the latest round of shuttle diplomacy, when the EU delegation, led by French President Nicolas Sarkozy, visited both Moscow and Tbilisi, securing a promise of a Russian withdrawal from Georgia?
No, We Are Not all Georgians
September 11, 2008
Dick Cheney’s pledge of solidarity with Georgia is all about antagonising Russia, securing oil and helping the Republicans
Rarely does Dick Cheney venture abroad without setting off some sort of tempest in foreign policy circles. And his most recent trip to Azerbaijan, Ukraine and Georgia did not disappoint. The US vice-president offered Ukraine and Georgia Nato membership and promised the latter $1bn in humanitarian aid to put itself back together after its war with Russia.
When did Georgia become America’s 51st state? I applaud moves to send humanitarian aid, but $1bn to a country of 4 million inhabitants? What makes me sick to my stomach is that the aid is not one of American generosity - it is a cold, calculated move aimed squarely at Russia. Moreover, we are rewarding the Georgian government’s reckless behaviour - invading a separatist province despite reported warnings from Washington not to - and creating a moral hazard in the process.
Cheney, on his visit, called the Georgians “courageous” and said Americans “stand in solidarity with people of Georgia”. Really? I bet most Americans couldn’t even pinpoint South Ossetia on a map, much less pronounce the name of the province.
The reason for Americans’ sudden love of all things Georgian is manifold. First, a renewed cold war-style confrontation with Russia has been in the offing for the past few years. The Yukos affair, Russia’s cyber war with Estonia and the British Council row were all signs pointing in this direction. Every time Vladimir Putin clears his throat, something anti-western comes blurting out.
Second, Georgia falls on an important energy corridor. The Baku-Ceyhan pipeline runs east-west beneath its ground and is vital to keeping the paws of Iran and Russia off Caspian crude. Nobody knows this better than Cheney. Before he leaves office, he is eager to shore up energy projects for future clients - the better to pad his retirement earnings out of office. And Georgia pays handsomely, as Randy Scheunemann - who penned a $200,000 contract back in April with Tbilisi while working as John McCain’s senior foreign policy adviser - surely knows.
Third, Georgia’s President Mikhail Saakashvili has launched a charm offensive of Ahmed Chalabi-like proportions. Every neoconservative in Washington has been wined and dined by the dapper young English-speaking president. To return the favour, nearly all of Washington turned a blind eye when Saakashvili ordered his troops to fire on unarmed protestors last November and shut down independent television stations, prompting a snap presidential election.
Finally, a cold war with Russia helps the Republicans. The more American voters are twitchy on national security, the more they lean right. Even Putin has hinted that the Georgian operation was hatched in Washington to help McCain. While that idea is a bit far-fetched and conspiratorial, the beneficiary of worsened US-Russian relations is no doubt McCain (and of course Sarah Palin is a well-seasoned Kremlinologist, thanks to her state’s close proximity to Russia!).
This is not to excuse Russian behaviour. It would be difficult to defend the Kremlin’s actions anywhere in its near abroad over the past decade. But recklessly siding with any state that stands up to Russia or haphazardly expanding Nato eastward is neither a sound policy nor a strategic priority, what with Iran racing forward on its nuclear ambitions and Afghanistan looking more like Iraq every week. Russian cooperation on these issues is needed. That does not mean we should not criticise Moscow, but by poking the Russian bear in the eye, Cheney will only bequeath to the next president a foreign policy mess in the making.
Georgia fits neatly into the Republicans’ black-and-white fiction of its foreign policy - the narrative that there is good and evil in this world and Russia falls squarely under the latter. Attempting to parse situations such as Russia’s war with Georgia and find nuance is something Democrats like to do, akin to negotiating with evil, a phrase often heard last week in St Paul.
Cheney’s reckless foreign policy should be reined in. Promising all sorts of handouts to Georgia, Ukraine and Azerbaijan is not a coherent policy. It is a knee-jerk response to Russian aggression that will only fan the flames.
Interestingly, if Saakashvili is a “political corpse”, as Russian President Dmitry Medvedev described him in a fit of anger, then Cheney’s recent meeting with the Georgian leader was just one political corpse talking to another.
Source: The Guardian, September 2008
www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/sep/09/dickcheney.usforeignpolicy
U.S. Still Weighing Stronger Action Against Russia, Officials Say
September 10, 2008
Testifying before a Senate panel, two officials defend the administration’s response to the Georgia crisis. One suggests the U.S. will allow Russia’s de facto rule in two Georgian breakaway republics.
Two top U.S. officials, confronting charges that the Bush administration sent mixed signals to Russia and Georgia before last month’s conflict over separatist South Ossetia, said that both countries had been warned to avoid armed conflict.
But the officials also acknowledged in Senate testimony that the administration was still debating whether to take stronger action against Russia for its incursion into the Caucasus nation last month, focusing for now on the shorter-term goal of getting Russian troops to leave Georgia proper.
The testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee laid bare the multiple and occasionally conflicting pressures buffeting the administration over the Georgia crisis — and revealed the U.S. government’s struggle to form a coherent policy to deal with a newly assertive Kremlin even before hostilities broke out.
Appearing before the panel were Daniel Fried, the head of European affairs at the State Department, who dealt personally with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili in the weeks leading up to the Russian incursion, and Eric Edelman, the head of policy at the Pentagon.
Democratic senators alternately accused the administration of failing to take stronger, concrete action against Russia for its military offensive and of inflammatory rhetoric that put at risk cooperation with Moscow on a range of U.S. foreign policy needs, including containing Iranian nuclear ambitions and thwarting terrorists.
Fried said measures such as excluding Russia from the World Trade Organization and the Group of 8 leading industrial nations were not “off the table” within the administration. But he said the U.S. was reluctant to inflame tensions while hoping that Russia would reverse direction in Georgia.
“First, let’s get the Russian troops out,” Fried said, when pressed on whether the U.S. would respond more concretely. “Let’s help Georgia recover, stabilize itself, and let’s think through very carefully the consequences for our relations with Russia, working with Europe.”
Russian forces swept through two pro-Moscow breakaway republics and into Georgia proper last month after Georgian forces tried to retake one of them, South Ossetia. The West has been pressing Moscow to pull back its troops and return to the status quo before the clash, with a limited force of Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the other separatist republic.
Russia on Tuesday unveiled plans to leave a total of 7,600 troops in the two republics. The announcement came a day after Moscow agreed to withdraw its soldiers from Georgia proper.
Russia has officially recognized the independence of the republics, and on Tuesday opened diplomatic relations with their self-declared national governments. So far, Nicaragua is the only country that has joined Moscow in recognizing the separatists.
U.S. officials have canceled joint military exercises with Russia and shelved a civil nuclear agreement. However, the main reaction by the U.S. and its allies has been rhetorical.
Countering Democratic arguments that the administration was reacting too cautiously, Fried and Edelman noted that the Kremlin appeared to be trying to exploit differences within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in hopes of splitting the alliance. They argued that it was essential to stay on the same page as NATO allies when dealing with Russia.
Fried dismissed charges that condemnation of Russia’s action was too modest a response, saying the Kremlin was facing diplomatic isolation.
“You’re quite right that a couple of communiques that use the word ‘condemn,’ by themselves, if this is all there is, does not constitute a lasting lesson,” Fried said. “But it is a pretty good beginning.”
Still, Fried and Edelman remained vague about how the administration might attempt to get tougher, sidestepping several questions from the committee’s Democratic chairman, Sen. Carl Levin of Michigan, about what measures the administration was actively considering.
Fried went so far as to suggest that, though the administration adamantly opposed any Russian move to annex Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it was willing to allow de facto Russian control of the regions.
He said that it was a prime American goal to prevent Georgia’s sovereignty from being “crushed.”
But he noted that such an outcome meant “Russia will have succeeded in grabbing two small provinces and nothing more,” a tacit acknowledgment that the U.S. may not oppose Russian military occupation of the republics for an extended period.
Still, Fried said he believed that the prospect of diplomatic and economic isolation could begin to build pressure on Russia. He argued that the Kremlin needs Western markets and capital investment for growth and economic diversification.
“Although their bank accounts are full of money earned by exporting oil and natural gas, Russia has substantial weaknesses,” Fried said. “Russian leaders are mistaken if they think they can, like the Soviet Union, live and prosper in their own world, apart from the West.”
Source: The Los Angeles Times, September 2008
www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-usgeorgia10-2008sep10,0,4678525.story
Cold Comfort
September 10, 2008
The European Union unites in rather mild and belated criticism of Russia’s war in Georgia
DEPENDING where you live in Europe and whom you blame for the Russian-Georgian war, the European Union’s emergency summit meeting on September 1st was a triumph, a failure or just the best that could be expected. Against objections from some Russia-friendly quarters, chiefly Italy’s prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi, the EU condemned Russian actions in Georgia, agreed to step up efforts to help ex-Soviet countries under threat and blocked talks on a new partnership deal.
Even agreeing that was tricky. Britain had been demanding a “root and branch” re-examination of the EU’s relationship with Russia—a critical viewpoint shared with Poland, the Baltic states and Sweden, whose foreign minister, Carl Bildt, has explicitly compared Russia’s tactics with Germany’s in the 1930s. Most of the big European countries are a lot more cautious. They blame Georgia, seen as an irresponsible American protégé, for starting the war but object to Russia’s precipitate diplomatic recognition of Georgia’s two breakaway territories, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and the lingering Russian military presence in buffer zones. Above all, they are glad that a row with an important trading partner has cooled.
The hope is that France’s president, Nicolas Sarkozy, who is visiting Russia on September 8th, will bring back agreement on a Russian withdrawal in accordance with the ceasefire he brokered. Russia’s president, Dmitry Medvedev, has promised this on at least four occasions. But Russia’s prime minister, Vladimir Putin, has declared that the port of Poti, a long way from the separatist regions, is part of Russia’s self-declared “security zone”. His spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, said that Russian troops (now labelled peacekeepers) would maintain their “temporary presence”. Even so, optimists think that it will soon be business as usual, particularly as Russia starts to count the economic cost of the war, which has sent shares plunging and encouraged capital flight.
Maybe, but what is happening in practice is another story. Even the details of implementing the ceasefire are unclear. One reason is that the document itself is so vague. Veterans of the many ceasefire negotiations during the wars in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s were aghast when they saw the text, which exists in multiple inconsistent versions and lacks the vital specifics of dates and placenames, leaving far too much wiggle room. Russian officials now say that their forces will move back only when Georgia also abides by the agreement as they define it. They are demanding that Western countries observe an arms embargo on Georgia, the “aggressor” party. That leaves plenty of scope for quibbling and delay.
A second problem is the role of the international monitors from the EU and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, a Vienna-based international body that supposedly defuses the continent’s conflicts. Will these people be allowed to move freely inside all of what the West regards as Georgia, including South Ossetia and Abkhazia where Russian-backed militias are engaged in purges of the ethnic Georgian population? Russia, at present, says that it is too dangerous to allow this. But if they are allowed in, on what terms will that be? Foreign journalists and diplomats are repeatedly told that they need documents issued by the separatist authorities—or in some cases, as shockingly happened to the French ambassador to Georgia, Russian visas. Georgia and its allies will vigorously resist the application of such rules to international officials.
It is still unclear what Russia really wants in Georgia—or elsewhere. In Moscow, the mood is defiant, unrepentant and uncompromising. Mr Medvedev and a raft of top officials have scoffed at talk of serious punitive action. “Bring it on” appears to be their devil-may-care mantra. Convinced that the days of a unipolar Washington-centric world are dead and buried, Russia believes it has a privileged place at the top table of a fast-changing multipolar world. Any attempt to mete out punishment will backfire. “The G8 will be practically unable to function without Russia,” Mr Medvedev calmly told Italian television. “That’s why we don’t fear being expelled.” On NATO’s freezing of ties with Russia, he remarked: “We don’t see anything dramatic or difficult about suspending our relations…But I think our partners will lose more from that.” Unmentioned but clearly meant was NATO’s reliance on Russia to supply its forces in Afghanistan.
The EU’s mild rebuke and tentative sanctions brought an outright welcome. The freezing of talks on a new deal with the EU, already much delayed, is seen as of little importance. Though junior officials expressed irritation at “biased statements” in the EU declaration, Mr Medvedev hailed the union’s avoidance of real sanctions as “reasonable” and “realistic”. The president seemed to put all disagreement with Russia down to a temporary misunderstanding: it was “not fatal” because “things change in the world.”
Political Corpse
But not, it seems, as far as talks with the Georgian leadership is concerned. “President [Mikheil] Saakashvili no longer exists in our eyes,” said Mr Medvedev. “He is a political corpse.” Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, advised Europe to decide its policy towards Russia based on its own “core interests” (ie, without America) in a speech larded with snide remarks about American arrogance and unilateralism. “The phantom of the Great Game wanders again in the Caucasus,” he said. If America and its allies chose to side with what he called “Saakashvili’s regime” it would be a “mistake of truly historic proportions”.
That fits with earlier Russian demands for a change of Georgian leadership. Russia has said that its prosecutors are collecting evidence in South Ossetia with which to indict Mr Saakashvili as a war criminal. Many of Georgia’s Western friends would be delighted if someone with an easier personality (and greater readiness to listen to advice) were in charge. But they want that to happen as part of Georgia’s normal internal politics, not as a putsch dictated by Moscow. As the box on the last page of this section points out, Georgian politicians now think the same.
The double-act between Mr Medvedev and Mr Putin creates extra scope for manoeuvre. Mr Medvedev promises to calm things down. Then Mr Putin stirs them up again, accusing in all seriousness the Bush administration of staging the war to boost John McCain’s election chances.
Part of the motive for the war may have been to distract attention from problems inside Russia, such as inflation, corruption, squabbling inside the circles of power and the failure to distribute fairly the proceeds of the oil and gas bonanza of past years. As the oil price falls towards $100 a barrel, the focus on that will sharpen.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the most unpleasant side of Russian politics is leaking to its near neighbours. Over the weekend, Mr Medvedev said that protecting the lives and dignity of Russian citizens abroad was an “unquestionable priority”, as well as protecting the interests of Russian businesses there. He also spoke of “countries with which we share special historical relations” where Russia has “privileged interests”. Though Mr Medvedev stressed the need for friendly relations, he also implied that such countries might not have the option of following policies that Russia deemed unfriendly (such as wanting to join NATO or host American bases). It would have been hard to find anything more likely to make the fears of Russia’s neighbours seem justified, to stoke Western support for them and to undermine those who think that Russia will soon return to “normal”.
Diplomatic support for Russia has been scanty, even among close allies. No country, Russia apart, has given the two statelets formal diplomatic recognition. Belarus and Tajikistan say they will do so, but the former, which is being squeezed by Russia over energy supplies, spoke in notably lukewarm terms and only after Russia’s ambassador to Minsk decried the government’s “incomprehensible silence”.
Perhaps most significant has been the critical reaction from the intergovernmental Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, which Russia has been building up as a counterweight to American influence. A statement from its meeting last week supported Russian peacekeeping efforts but stressed the importance of territorial integrity and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. This was a clear snub that showed a startling lack of support for Russia’s actions both from the four Central Asian members of the SCO and from China.
Chill from China
China’s leaders have enjoyed unnerving America by flirting with Russia, but this has always stopped well short of any hint of confrontation. Although China’s state-run media has avoided criticising Russia, and has highlighted the West’s discomfort at Georgia’s defeat, China’s official position on Russia’s recognition of the breakaway regions has been surprisingly chilly. A Chinese spokesman said his country was “concerned” and called for “dialogue and consultation”. That reflects both China’s pragmatic desire for good economic relations with the West, and also its dislike of both separatism and interference in other countries’ internal affairs. With Tibet, Taiwan and restive Muslims to contend with, China takes a dim view of anybody chopping up other countries and declaring the results to be independent states.
The same thinking has marred Russia’s image in normally friendly countries such as Greece and Cyprus (which bristles about the Turkish-backed “pseudo-state”) and Spain (which is twitchy about Basque and Catalan separatism). All this suggests a degree of miscalculation in Moscow. Over the past decade, the future of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was a useful bargaining chip. Now it has been cashed in, without much benefit.
Cooking up new Russia policies will take time. The result may well not be to the Kremlin’s taste. “We are back to square one,” says Alexander Stubb, Finland’s foreign minister. Many Western countries are now reassessing their relations with Russia in ways that range from the need for higher defence spending to a reduction in dependence on Russian energy. Mr Sarkozy says that France, which holds the EU presidency, will launch a big new defence initiative in October.
The EU is better at giving carrots than wielding sticks. It will find it easier to provide generous support for the reconstruction of Georgia than do anything that might be seen as punishing Russia. Even so, timid as this response may seem, it is also something of a watershed: for the first time the EU’s 27 countries got together and agreed on sharp public criticism of Russia.
The United States has announced a $1 billion aid package for Georgia. The International Monetary Fund has agreed to lend the country $750m. Underlining Georgia’s importance as an energy corridor, America’s vice-president, Dick Cheney, visited the region this week. He hopes to get Azerbaijan to commit gas exports to the €8 billion ($11.5 billion) Nabucco project, which extends a gas pipeline to Europe from Georgia and Turkey. But Nabucco’s chances are looking increasingly slim. This week Russia stepped up its energy diplomacy, agreeing on a deal with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan on a new pipeline via Russia that would entrench the Kremlin’s hold on east-west gas supplies. Though the EU is Russia’s largest customer, individual countries’ dependency (see chart) has undermined the union’s collective bargaining power.
America is also supporting Georgia’s demand for a tough non-recognition policy towards South Ossetian and Abkhaz independence. Companies doing business in the two self-proclaimed countries will find that their managers and shareholders cannot get American or European visas, officials say. But will big European countries such as Germany go along with that? Outsiders will be scrutinising closely the atmosphere at the annual German-Russian intergovernmental meeting in October—an occasion normally marked by warm rhetoric about the two countries’ mutual interdependence.
The mood in NATO is noticeably more hawkish than in the EU. A senior official says that the days when it was regarded as “taboo” to discuss any military threat from Russia in the alliance’s contingency planning are all but over. When NATO defence ministers meet in London on September 18th, a big question will be how to defend existing members, chiefly the Baltic states, which are small, weak and on Russia’s border. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania joined the alliance in 2004, when such questions were dismissed as too theoretical to worry about (or alternatively too provocative to consider). Now they are unavoidable.
Minorities as ammunition
The potential flashpoint, as with the war in Georgia, is a legacy of the Soviet Union (see table). Russia says that the language and citizenship laws in Estonia and Latvia discriminate against Russian-speakers. The hundreds of thousands of people (mainly from Russia) who moved to these countries during the Soviet occupation did not automatically become citizens when Estonia and Latvia regained independence. Many were naturalised in the 1990s, and a steady trickle continue to pass the language exams and apply for citizenship. But an alienated minority of stateless people, and tens of thousands who carry Russian passports, are a potential nightmare for the Baltic states and their friends. Disturbances in the Estonian capital, Tallinn, last year over a clumsy government decision to move a Soviet war memorial inflamed feelings that have not yet subsided.
Lithuania’s problems are different (it has a small Russian minority which gained automatic citizenship in 1991). But it is a transit route for Russian troops to the exclave of Kaliningrad. That offers plenty of scope for provocation. Russia has cut off oil supplies, ostensibly because the pipeline is decrepit (but has refused a Lithuanian offer to pay for its repair). And populist parties led by politicians with strong Kremlin links are doing well in the run-up to a general election in October.
Diverging footsteps
The Baltic armed forces are tiny and are configured to support NATO efforts in faraway countries such as Afghanistan, not to defend the region against a real attack from Russia. NATO’s military presence consists only of a handful of fighter aircraft (currently four from Germany) based at an air base in Lithuania. It also has a cyber-defence centre in Estonia, and all three countries have NATO-standard radars that can look deep into Russia.
Beefing that up without feeding Russian paranoia will be tricky. “Don’t expect a fanfare,” says the NATO official. “We will do it in a low-key, professional way.” The Baltic states themselves will be expected to spend more on defence—no easy task as a sharp economic slowdown bites.
Another question for NATO is how much help to offer in restoring Georgia’s armed forces. Although Western military advisers have been surprised, and even scandalised, by the poor showing of the Georgian army, which retreated in poor order, dumping huge quantities of donated American equipment and ammunition, Georgia itself is optimistic about rebuilding it.
The other country most threatened by Russia is Ukraine. Mr Putin said in April that it risked dismemberment if it tried to join NATO, and opinion inside the country is deeply divided on the issue. Politics is unstable too: this week Ukraine’s president, Viktor Yushchenko, threatened to call a snap election to defend himself against what he termed a “putsch” by parliament, which wants to strip him of his powers. The West will tread gingerly into that, though NATO may step up its fairly uncontroversial defence training activities.
Yet NATO is barely less divided than the EU. It is not just that European countries blocked the American plan to give Ukraine and Georgia a clear path to potential membership at the alliance’s summit in April. Turkey, the most important NATO member in the Black Sea region, is torn between the competing claims of strategic partnership with America and its strong trading links with Russia (which supplies most of its gas). Although Turkey has helped to train Georgia’s armed forces (evidently not very successfully), it did not share radar and other military data with Georgia during the series of pinprick attacks by Russia that preceded the full-scale war.
Turkey is pushing its own regional initiative, involving Russia and the Caucasus countries but not America. That might help settle another lingering conflict, between Armenia and Azerbaijan. But Georgia regards anything that excludes the United States as unacceptable. For now, the hottest issue for Turkey is whether to allow America to send more warships through the Bosporus straits into the Black Sea, something that Russia vigorously opposes.
Having caught the West napping (or at least on holiday), Russia scored a pleasant victory over a weak and unpopular adversary. But now it has to deal with the consequences: war fever at home plus alienated allies and stronger critics abroad. Will Russia’s leaders respond to this by raising the stakes, in the hope of showing their opponents’ underlying weakness? The West’s leaders worriedly hope not.
Source: The Economist, September 2008
www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12052710
U.S. Intelligence Sees It Russia’s Way
September 10, 2008
American intelligence confirms that the latest military actions in South Ossetia were started by Georgia and Russia’s position in the conflict was correct, says Republican California Congressman Dana Rohrabacher. He said the situation reminded him of the Bay of Tonkin incident, which the U.S. used as a pretext for beginning the war in Vietnam.
“The Russians are right! We’re wrong! Georgia started it, the Russians ended it,” Rohrabacher said at a hearing in the House of Representatives.
Assistant Secretary of State Dan Fried said U.S. intelligence was still working on an exact chronology of the events of August 7 to verify Georgian claims that Russian forces were in Roki Tunnel, linking Russia to South Ossetia, before Georgia attacked. Fried said that the Bush administration had forcefully and repeatedly warned the Georgians against beginning military actions against Russia, and he was unable to say why Georgia chose to ignore that advice.
Nonetheless, Fried acknowledged that supporting Georgia was in U.S. interests, even if it considers the countries actions foolish.
Russia acknowledged the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia on August 26. Those republics requested that recognition after Georgian forces almost completely ruined Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, in the course of the event of August 8-12. More than 1500 civilians were killed in that time, according to South Ossetian authorities.
Source: Kommersant, September 2008
www.kommersant.com/p-13183/r_538/Russia_Georgia_conflict_U.S._hearings/
Volker: Russia Must Do ‘What It Has Said It Would Do’
September 10, 2008
In an exclusive interview, U.S. Ambassador to NATO Kurt Volker provides his insights into the crisis in Georgia.
Speaking to RFE/RL correspondent Ahto Lobjakas, Volker says Russian troops in Georgia must ultimately withdraw and return to the lines held before fighting broke out last month. And he stresses that Abkhazia and South Ossetia must participate in upcoming talks on their future only as “parts of Georgian sovereign territory.”
RFE/RL: Regarding the terms negotiated September 8 by the European Union in Moscow on the withdrawal of Russian forces from parts of Georgia, are they good enough for the United States?
Kurt Volker: Let me start out by saying we appreciate the efforts of French President [Nicolas] Sarkozy and the European Union to continue to urge Russia to implement the agreement that was reached on August 12. We think it is important that they continue those efforts.
Ultimately, if we’re going to have a settlement to the conflict zones, all the parties [in Geneva] are going to have to be engaged, but they will not be there as independent states.
I think that it has now been four weeks since Russia first promised on August 12 to implement the cease-fire and to withdraw its forces. We still haven’t seen it yet. So, it was important to have that step in Moscow [on September 8], to urge Russia to again to comply with that. The terms there are important steps, they can bring us in the right direction. We have to see Russia implement them.
And we have to remember that this is all in the context of our firm support for Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
RFE/RL: Do you think the European Union could bring more pressure to bear on Russia?
Volker: I think that we have to see Russia implement what it has committed [itself] to, including the totality of the August 12 agreement. In order for them to do that they need to know that the international community is watching and is prepared to respond if they don’t.
And we’ve seen, I think, a fairly united stance from the international community in recent weeks, including the EU, including NATO, including individual countries, and including G7 foreign ministers speaking with each other. I’m quite sure that that kind of international pressure and the fact of Russia isolating itself from the international community would only intensify if they failed to implement the agreement.
‘Bottom Lines Are Very Clear’
RFE/RL: Do you think the European Union and the United States share the same bottom line when it comes to the long term of the Russian withdrawal? Does the United States think Russia will need to remove its troops from South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as the rest of Georgia?
Volker: I think the bottom lines here are very clear and fully supported by both the United States and the EU, and for that matter also here within NATO. To be specific on the point that you raise:
We need to first make sure that Russia has done what it has said it would do before we get to the point of talking about the structure of the Geneva talks.
The agreement reached on August 12 says that the Russians need to withdraw to the positions before August 6. That means that they would have some troops in South Ossetia and in Abkhazia, but they would not have combat forces and they would be at the level that was pertaining at that time. That is a common view of the EU, the United States, and NATO.
We also have a common view that we stand by and support Georgia’s sovereignty and integrity, that these regions are not independent states but, in fact, part of the sovereign territory of Georgia, and that we want to see a long-term process in place for a political settlement for these conflict zones.
RFE/RL: Does the United States support the Russian request that South Ossetia and Abkhazia be fully represented at the talks in Geneva that are to start on October 15?
Volker: We need to first make sure that Russia has done what it has said it would do before we get to the point of talking about the structure of the Geneva talks. We need to make sure that Russia is, in fact, implementing the withdrawal of its forces that it promised to do.
Ultimately, if we’re going to have a settlement to the conflict zones, all the parties are going to have to be engaged, but they will not be there as independent states. We would need to be engaging the peoples of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as part of Georgia’s sovereign territory.
Source: RFE/RL, September 2008
www.rferl.org/content/Volker_Russia_Must_Do_What_It_Has_Said_It_Would_Do/1197792.html
US Confident of NATO Nod to Georgia, Ukraine: Official
September 8, 2008
The United States is confident that Georgia and Ukraine will become members of the NATO military alliance and sees growing support in Europe for that prospect, a top US administration official said Monday.
Russia’s recognition of Georgian breakaway regions South Ossetia and Abkhazia has increased backing for expansion of the 26-member alliance, the official said as US Vice President Dick Cheney held talks with Italian leaders here.
“There may be debates about timing, conditions and so forth, but if anything what has happened in Georgia has probably broadened support within the alliance for the proposition that eventually they ought to be members of NATO,” he said on condition of anonymity.
Cheney last week vowed Washington’s support for Baku, Tbilisi and Kiev during a whistle-stop tour of the region, and urged NATO to unite in order to ward off a return of “line-drawing” in Europe.
He held talks at the weekend with political and business leaders at a conference in Italy — including Israeli President Shimon Peres, former Spanish prime minister Jose Maria Aznar, and top world oil executives.
The US vice president arrived Sunday in Rome for talks with Italy’s president and prime minister as part of a bid to garner support among Washington’s European allies for a stronger stance against Russia after its five-day war with Georgia last month.
“It is not just a US problem, all of Europe has a stake in how this is handled and whether or not these sovereign independent states remain free and independently sovereign states,” the official said.
“I think it will get resolved. The resolution that was adopted at the Bucharest summit that said Georgia and Ukraine will become members of NATO represents the thinking of most of our NATO allies.”
At its summit in Bucharest in April, NATO refused to grant Ukraine and Georgia “Membership Action Plan” (MAP) status after French and German opposition, though leaders agreed on a statement saying “that these countries will become members of NATO.”
Russia has opposed inclusion of Georgia and Ukraine, saying that NATO expansion and its support of a planned US anti-missile system in the Czech Republic and Poland is a “strategic error.”
The official reiterated the US view that an expanded NATO would pose no threat to Russia, and vowed that the United States wants a good rapport with Russia despite soaring tensions over Moscow’s action in Georgia.
“We are still very interested in having normal relations with Russia. That hasn’t changed. That is a long term proposition, but obviously we are not happy with what has happened in Georgia.”
Cheney met Sunday with Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini, who has urged Russia to “reexamine” its freeze on relations with NATO. Moscow last month said it would halt military cooperation as relations between Russia and the West deteriorated over the conflict in Georgia.
The US vice president meets Tuesday with Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, who has a warm personal relationship with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin and hopes to play a mediating role between Moscow and Europe.
Source: AFP, September 2008