MIA: Policeman Killed at Abkhaz Border
September 13, 2008
A Georgian policeman was killed after “the Abkhaz separatists opened fire” in direction of the police post in the village of Ganmukhuri on September 13, the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs said.
Medvedev Describes Georgia Attack as Russia’s 9/11
September 13, 2008
· President says US backed assault on South Ossetia
· Nato membership ‘would destabilise region’
Georgia’s attack on the breakaway region of South Ossetia was unnecessary and unprovoked and was encouraged by the United States, Russia’s president, Dmitry Medvedev, said in an interview yesterday.
“For Russia, August 8 was like September 11 for the United States,” he told a group of foreign journalists and academics. “I would like to see major lessons from it for the world.”
He made clear that the lessons, as Russia sees them, are that the post-cold war “illusion” that a world with one super power is a safe and predictable place is now over.
The 42-year-old president said George Bush had phoned him shortly after he had ordered Russian forces to drive the Georgians back. “‘You’re a young president with a liberal background. Why do you need this?’ Medvedev quoted Bush as saying. “I told him we had no choice,” he said.
Suspicious Minds
September 13, 2008
It’s mutual mistrust, rather than a difference in basic outlook, that plagues the relationship between Russia and the west
A decade ago a member of Abkhazia parliament told me that “the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia would not be resolved until Russia and the west divide their spheres of interests”. We were sitting on the Black Sea coast and I thought that the guy was crazy. Surely, the conflict was between Georgians and Abkhazians, or Georgians and South Ossetians, and it was up to them to resolve their differences. How naive I had been. In his now traditional Valdai encounter with western experts, Prime Minister Putin confirmed what was obvious to separatist politicians 10 years ago.
The logic of the current discord runs as follows: The west assumes that Russia invaded Georgia in August to punish it for its Nato bid. It would have loved to do so to the Baltic states when they were joining Nato, but had no power at a time. Following this line, Ukraine is to be persecuted next, if not militarily, then politically and economically. Western efforts need to be geared to building a bastion around Ukraine to protect it from being the next victim.
GEORGIA: EXAMINING POSSIBLE SOVEREIGN FUTURES AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OPTION
September 13, 2008
At a recent special panel on the Georgian crisis convened at the Bled Strategic Forum, European foreign ministers and representatives of international organizations lamented that they had failed to adequately engage Georgia’s unresolved or “frozen conflicts.” Since the early 1990s, the international community effectively ignored the disputes between Tbilisi and Abkhazia and South Ossetia, allowing tensions to fester until in early August the disputes escalated into a six-day war between Georgia and Russia. Russia’s subsequent recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia independence has legally challenged Georgia’s very territorial integrity and sovereign boundaries.
While much of the West struggles to enforce a precarious ceasefire and formulate a common response to Russia’s actions, it is worth considering the exact sovereign forms that might govern Georgia in the near future. Three options - indefinite occupation, formal partition or international administration - are possible; though all three pose risks, the internationalization option, the least discussed thus far, may offer the best blueprint for stabilizing the region and eventually resolving status issues.
Under the first and most likely scenario, Abkhazia and South Ossetia will remain recognized by Russia and a handful of other countries, such as Nicaragua, that wish to curry favor with Moscow. We could refer to this as the “Cyprus model.” [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Under this arrangement, Russia ensures the dependency of the breakaway territories by stationing a permanent military contingent and keeping the de facto governments isolated from Georgia. In the case of Cyprus, the Turkish military intervention of 1974 was followed by a relatively stable three decades, during which a sizable contingent of Turkish troops was stationed in the self-proclaimed Turkish Northern Republic of Cyprus (TRNC). During this time the sequestered TRNC languished, while the Greek-Cypriot part of the island developed rapidly, culminating in its admission to the European Union 30 years later. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
The Cyprus model is less likely to stabilize Georgia. Unlike Cyprus or Northern Ireland, Georgia and the breakaway territories have no realistic hope of being absorbed by the European Union. Tbilisi has made restoring Georgia’s territorial integrity politically paramount and, even after its military defeat, is already being supported anew by inflows of US economic and military assistance. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. The risk of a renewed military clash between Georgia and the breakaway territories will loom large as long as the United States and Russia actively supports each side.
Perpetual unrecognized status also would have destructive economic consequences. Unable to forge “normal” economic ties with the world due to an international embargo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia would be forced to depend exclusively on Russian aid packages and fiscal transfers. Without official aid from international economic institutions, the de facto authorities and their security services would be forced to operate within the illicit economy and would exploit their unregulated legal status to engage in smuggling, trafficking and money laundering.
A second, though less likely sovereign possibility, is that Georgia itself will be formally partitioned. Under what some have advocated as a “grand compromise” between Russia and the West, a pro-Western Georgia would be admitted to NATO, but its territory would be curtailed as the breakaway territories would be severed and either formally annexed to the Russian Federation (more likely in the Ossetian case) or recognized internationally as independent.
Although, such an arrangement could “normalize” the status and behavior of the territories, partition would set an unacceptably dangerous international precedent, one considerably more destabilizing than the so-called “Kosovo precedent.” Regional powers would retain the right to intervene militarily in neighboring states under a type of ethnically based justification that the international community explicitly rejected during the Balkan Wars. A legally partitioned Georgia would also dramatically heighten the insecurity of other post-Soviet territories with large numbers ethnic Russians, especially Ukraine, Moldova and Kazakhstan.
A third option would be to internationalize the status of the breakaway territories altogether and place them under international trusteeship and administration. With authorization from the United Nations, the international community - as it did in the post conflict settings of Bosnia and Kosovo - could assume supervision of the sovereignty of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. An international peacekeeping force would guarantee security, one that would include a sizable contingent of Russian peacekeepers, but who would be placed under an international command structure. International peacekeepers could be supplemented by an external civilian police force that would coordinate with the activities of the de facto security services under OSCE auspices.
As they did in East Timor and Kosovo, UN civilian advisors would work with de facto authorities and their respective ministries to bring administrative capacity and practices up to international democratic standards. An international body could monitor the orderly return of internally displaced persons to certain areas and begin a process of property claims and restitution. The move to final status negotiations would be deferred until international monitors were satisfied that governance had been brought in line with international standards.
International administration would also economically connect for the first time the breakaway territories to the international economy and its institutions. Abkhazia and South Ossetia could be offered valuable trade deals and would become eligible for reconstruction funds from the European Union, emergency financing from the International Monetary Fund and development aid from the World Bank. Increased economic ties with Georgia would help forge links and business interests between the communities.
Though not the current first choice option of any of the regional parties involved, an internationalization strategy could yield benefits for all sides. The international community would have a common focal point to channel its engagement and resources, while the de facto governments of the breakaway territories would be offered a chance to finally engage with the international community as if they were independent. The government of Georgia would buy itself a number of years to rebuild trust with authorities in Abkhazia and/or South Ossetia before status would be decided. Finally, the Russian Federation, by conceding the territories to international authority, could demonstrate its willingness to play an engaged and constructive role in an internationally sanctioned legal process to stabilize the region. An international presence that guaranteed order and stability would transform the run-up to the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, just miles from the Abkhaz border, from a tense and volatile political dispute, to a pre-Olympic period that showcased Russia’s pivotal role in facilitating renewed international engagement with the Caucasus.
Source: Eurasianet.Org, September 2008
www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav091208.shtml
Abkhazia Now Craves Investors’ Recognition
September 12, 2008
Abkhazia is looking to attract investors with sandy beaches, 220 days of sunshine every year and an airport that once served as a backup landing pad for the Soviet space shuttle.
“We are ready to talk to any country, organization or firm,” Abkhaz leader Sergei Bagapsh said.
Abkhazia and another republic, South Ossetia, broke away from Georgia following the Soviet collapse. Abkhazia has lived in poverty and oblivion after winning de facto independence in a 1992-93 war against Georgia, with no county agreeing to recognize it.
Abkhazia Looks to Join Belarus-Russia Alliance
September 11, 2008
President Sergey Bagapsh, of the newly independent republic of Abkhazia, has announced it will apply to join the Union of Russia and Belarus. He also signalled Abkhazia’s intention to join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO).
“After signing the required agreements and documents we will make an application to join as a union state. If the CIS expands, we are ready to join it, as well as the CSTO,” said Bagapsh.
He made the announcement at a Sochi press conference attended by Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
Russia recognised the independence of Abkhazia on August 26. Belarus has yet to do so, but the country’s president, Aleksandr Lukashenko, has said he will consider the matter after the Belarus elections at the end of September. Belarus must recognize Abkhazia as an independent state before it can admit it into any political alliance.
The Union of Russia and Belarus functions as a platform for economic and political harmonisation between the two nations, and has put forward plans for a common currency and customs regime.
Link to Story:
www.russiatoday.com/news/news/30272
Link to Video:
www.russiatoday.com/news/news/30272/video
Source: Russia Today, September 2008
South Ossetia May Intend to Join RF
September 11, 2008
South Ossetia intends to become part of Russia, the republic’s president, Eduard Kokoity, told the international Valdai Club. “We do not intend to make an independent Ossetia,” Kokoity said. Rather, he explained, South Ossetia will unite with North Ossetia. Kokoity stated that the West promised to recognize an independent Tskhinvali, if an independent Ossetia was created from the North, which is part of Russia, and the South.
“Western experts, political scientists, proposed that we convince North Ossetia to secede from Russia. They promised recognition before Kosovo,” Kokoity said. He did not answer a foreign journalist’s question about how long South Ossetia would be able to remain independent, preferring to say that the most important thing for North and South Ossetia is the restoration of historical justice.
“It is more a humanitarian problem than a political problem,” Kokoity said, adding that the unification of North and South Ossetia is the only way to preserve the nation. “I would be very glad if we were part of Russia,” he said.
Later, according to the Interfax information agency, Kokoity contradicted himself and stated that South Ossetia will remain independent. A number of South Ossetian officials have said that the republic will become part of Russia within several years.
Source: Kommersant, September 2008
www.kommersant.com/p-13194/Russia_Georgia_South_Ossetia_conflict/
Abkhazia Expects Deal On Russian Military Bases
September 11, 2008
Abkhazia will sign an agreement with Moscow establishing Russian military bases in the province following its decision to break away from Georgia, its leader has said.
President Sergei Bagapsh criticized Georgia’s efforts to join NATO, saying this would threaten the whole northern Caucasus region, and said Abkhazia might join the loose Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
“We will enter into a military agreement with the Russian Federation to protect ourselves against aggression,” Bagapsh told reporters in Sochi, a Black Sea resort in Russia. “It will be an agreement about the deployment of military bases on the territory of Abkhazia. After a political agreement we will sign a military agreement about bases, also in our sea ports.”
South Ossetia Does Not Want to Join Russia, says Moscow
September 11, 2008
Leader of breakaway Georgian region backtracks on earlier statement of intent to become part of Russian Federation
South Ossetia does not want to become part of Russia, the Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, said today, following a series of contradictory statements from Eduard Kokoity, the South Ossetian leader.
Kokoity was quoted by news agencies as telling a group of foreign policy experts Georgia’s breakaway province would join Russia. He later retracted the comments in an interview with the Russian news agency Interfax.
In trying to clear up matters during a visit to Warsaw, Lavrov later said: “South Ossetia doesn’t wish to join up with anyone.”
S.Ossetian Leader U-turns on Russia Merger
September 11, 2008
Russian news agencies have reported that the leader of South Ossetia said the breakaway Georgian region intends to become part of Russia, but later disavowed the comment and said there was no plan to relinquish independence.
Initial reports from Interfax and RIA-Novosti quoted Eduard Kokoity as saying “Yes, certainly, we will become part of Russia.”
His reported statement Thursday could be seen to undermine the position of the Kremlin, which said it sent in its military to defend the region’s independence.
A subsequent Interfax report quoted Kokoity as reversing that position.
“I have probably been misunderstood,” he was quoted as saying in an interview. “We are not going to relinquish our independence.”
Source: CNN, September 2008
edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/09/11/sossetia.russia.ap/index.html